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Abstract. We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and
independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Va¨a¨na¨nen, and their compositional se-
mantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special
case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness
theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each
aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the
semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which
combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new
connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but
which we show play a very natural roˆle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As
regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is
forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski
semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely
determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a
simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use
of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence
are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We
also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic
implication plays a very natural roˆle.
1. Introduction
Our aim in this paper is to take a fresh look at the logics of infor-
mational dependence and independence (Hintikka and Sandu, 1989;
Hintikka and Sandu, 1996; Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007), and their compositional
semantics due to Wilfrid Hodges (Hodges, 1997a; Hodges, 1997b). We
shall focus on Dependence Logic, introduced by the second author
(Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007).
The main objective of Hodges’ work was to provide a compositional
model-theoretic semantics for the IF-logic of Hintikka and Sandu (Hin-
tikka and Sandu, 1989; Hintikka and Sandu, 1996), which matched their
“game-theoretical semantics”. This was achieved by lifting the standard
Tarski semantics of first-order formulas, given in terms of satisfaction
in a structure with respect to an assignment to the free variables, to
satisfaction by sets of assignments.
We seek a deeper understanding of Hodges’ construction:
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2− First and foremost, what is going on? Where does the Hodges
construction come from? Is it canonical in any way? Why does it
work? What structures are really at play here?
− Because of the equivalence of Dependence Logic (or variants such
as IF-logic) under this semantics to (a significant fragment of)
second-order logic, there is no hope for a completeness theorem.
But we may get a useful completeness theorem with respect to a
wider class of models. Understanding the general algebraic context
for the semantics points the way to such a completeness notion.
− We can also look for representation theorems, with some in-
finitary ingredients.
The results of our investigation are quite surprising conceptually (at
least to us). The main points can be summarized as follows.
− We find a general context for Hodges’ construction. We shall not
treat it in full generality here, as the general account is best stated
in the language of categorical logic (Lawvere, 1969; Pitts, 2000),
and we wish to avoid undue technicalities. However, we will indi-
cate the possibilities for a general algebraic semantics, as the basis
for a useful completeness theorem.
− We find that the natural propositional logic associated with the
Hodges construction is the logic of Bunched Implication of
Pym and O’Hearn (O’Hearn and Pym, 1999; Pym, 2002), which
combines intuitionistic and multiplicative linear connectives.
− This not only yields a more natural view of the strangely asymmet-
ric notions of conjunction and disjunction in the Hodges semantics
(one is intuitionistic, while “disjunction” is actually multiplicative
conjunction!), it also brings into prominence some connectives
not previously considered in the setting of IF-logic or Depen-
dence logic, in particular intuitionistic implication. This en-
ables a novel analysis of the Dependence predicate of (Va¨a¨na¨nen,
2007), as a Horn clause with respect to a more primitive predicate
of single-valuedness. The well-known Armstrong axioms for func-
tional dependence (Armstrong, 1974) then fall out as a standard
axiomatization of intuitionistic (but not classical!) implication.
− Intuitionistic implication also plays a natural roˆle in our version of
a full abstraction theorem in the sense of Hodges.
− The construction is shown to lift the interpretation of the standard
quantifiers in a canonical way, so that quantifiers are uniquely
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3determined as the adjoints to substitution (Lawvere, 1969),
just as in the standard Tarski semantics of first-order logic. This
is also extended to characterizations of the dependence-friendly
quantifiers of (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007) as adjoints.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section
we provide background on branching quantifiers, IF-logic, dependence
logic, and Hodges’ semantics. Then in section 3 we show how the
Hodges semantics is an instance of a general algebraic construction, in
which the connectives of BI-logic arise naturally. In section 4, we show
that the interpretation of the quantifiers in the Hodges construction is
the canonical lift of the standard interpretation of the quantifiers as
adjoints, and hence is uniquely determined. We also use the intuition-
istic implication to show how the dependence-friendly quantifiers can
be interpreted as certain adjoints. In section 5, we show how the intu-
itionistic implication arises naturally in the proof of a full abstraction
theorem. In section 6, we show how the dependence predicate can be
analyzed in terms of a more primitive predicate of single-valuedness,
using the intuitionistic implication. This turns the “Armstrong axioms”
into standard theorems of intuitionistic implicational logic. The final
section outlines some further directions.
2. Dependence, Independence and Information Flow
We begin with a standard example: the formal definition of continuity
for a function f : R −→ R on the real numbers.
∀x.∀ǫ.∃δ.∀x′. |x− x′| < δ ⇒ |f(x)− f(x′)| < ǫ .
This definition is often explained in current calculus courses in terms
of an “epsilon-delta game”.1 The Adversary proposes a number, ǫ, as a
measure of how close we must stay to the value of f(x); we must then
respond with a number, δ, such that, whenever the input is within the
interval (x−δ, x+δ), the output does indeed pass the ǫ-test of closeness
to f(x). Clearly, the choice of δ will depend on that of ǫ; the nesting of
the quantifiers expresses this dependency.
This is the definition of global continuity of f , expressed in terms
of local continuity at every point x. This means that the choice of δ
will depend, not only on ǫ, but on x also. Now consider the definition
of uniform continuity:
∀ǫ.∃δ.∀x.∀x′. |x− x′| < δ ⇒ |f(x)− f(x′)| < ǫ .
Here δ still depends on ǫ, but must be chosen independently of x.
This variation in dependency is tracked syntactically by the different
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4order of the quantifiers. Indeed, it seems that it was only after the
distinction between pointwise and uniform notions of continuity, and,
especially, convergence, had been clarified in 19th-century analysis, that
the ground was prepared for the introduction of predicate calculus.
More generally, dependence or independence of bounds on various
parameters is an important issue in many results on estimates in num-
ber theory and analysis. Hodges quotes a nice example from one of
Lang’s books (Lang, 1964) in (Hodges, 1997a).
Intuitively, there is an evident relation between these notions and
that of information flow. Dependence indicates a form of information
flow; independence is the absence of information flow.
2.1. Beyond first-order logic
It turns out that mere rearrangement of the order of quantifiers in first-
order formulas is not sufficient to capture the full range of possibilities
for informational dependence and independence. This was first realized
almost 50 years ago, with Henkin’s introduction of branching quan-
tifiers (Henkin, 1961). The simplest case is the eponymous Henkin
quantifier: 
 ∀x ∃y
∀u ∃v

A(x, y, u, v).
The intention is that y must be chosen depending on x, but indepen-
dently of the choice of u; while v must be chosen depending on u, but
independently of the choice of x. The meaning of this formula can be
explicated by introducing Skolem functions f and g: an equivalent
formula will be
∃f.∃g.∀x.∀u.A(x, f(x), u, g(u)).
Here the constraints on dependencies are tracked by the dependence
of the Skolem functions on certain variables, but not on others. Note
that the Skolemized sentence is second-order; in fact, it belongs to
the Σ11 fragment of second-order logic.
2 This second-order rendition of
the meaning of the Henkin quantifier cannot be avoided, in the sense
that the Henkin quantifier strictly increases the expressive power of
first-order logic, and in fact the extension of first-order logic with the
Henkin quantifier is equivalent in expressive power to the Σ11 fragment
(Henkin, 1961).
2.1.0.1. Examples
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51. Consider
 ∀x ∃y
∀u ∃v

 (A(x)→ B(y)) ∧ (B(u)→ A(v)) ∧ [(x = v) ↔ (y = u)].
This expresses that A and B are equinumerous sets.
2. Now consider
∃v.

 ∀x1 ∃y1
∀x2 ∃y2

 (A(x1)→ A(y1)) ∧ [(x2 = y1) → (y2 = x1)]
∧ A(v) ∧ (A(x1)→ (y1 6= v)) .
This expresses that A is an infinite set.
These examples show that the Henkin quantifier is not expressible
in first-order logic.
2.2. Further developments
The next major development was the introduction of IF-logic (“inde-
pendence-friendly logic”) by Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu (Hin-
tikka and Sandu, 1989). The intention of IF-logic is to highlight in-
formational dependence and independence. It provides a linear syntax
for expressing branching quantification (and more), e.g. the Henkin
quantifier can be written in linear notation as:
∀x.∃y.∀u. (∃v/x). A(x, y, u, v)
The “slashed quantifier” (∃v/x) has the intended reading “there exists
a v not depending on x”. Note the strange syntactic form of this
quantifier, with its “outward-reaching” scope for x.
2.2.0.2. Dependence Logic A simplified approach was introduced by
the second author, and developed extensively in the recent monograph
(Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007). The main novelty in the formulation of the logic is to
use an atomic dependence predicate3 D(x1, . . . , xn, x) which holds
if x depends on x1, . . . , xn, and only on these variables. We can
then define “dependence-friendly quantifiers” as standard quantifiers
guarded with the dependence predicate:
(∃x \ x1, . . . , xn). φ ≡ ∃x.(D(x1, . . . , xn, x) ∧ φ) .
This yields essentially the same expressive power as IF-logic.
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62.3. Compositionality: Hodges’ Semantics
But, what does it all mean? Hintikka claimed that a compositional
semantics for IF logic could not be given (Hintikka, 1998). In-
stead he gave a “Game-Theoretical Semantics”, essentially reduction
to Skolem form as above.
Wilfrid Hodges showed that it could (Hodges, 1997a; Hodges, 1997b).4
Before giving Hodges’ construction, it will be useful firstly to recall
Tarski’s solution to the problem of how to define the truth of a sentence
in a first-order structureM = (A, . . .) with underlying set A.5 In order
to do this, he had to deal with the more general case of open formulas.
The idea was to define
M, s |=X φ
where X is a finite set of variables including those occurring free in φ,
and s is an assignment of elements of A to X.6 Typical clauses include:
M, s |=X φ ∧ ψ ≡ M, s |=X φ and M, s |=X ψ
M, s |=X ¬φ ≡ M, s 6|=X φ
M, s |=X ∀v. φ ≡ ∀a ∈ A.M, s[v 7→ a] |=X∪{v} φ
M, s |=X ∃v. φ ≡ ∃a ∈ A.M, s[v 7→ a] |=X∪{v} φ
Here s[v 7→ a] is the assignment defined on X ∪ {v} as follows: s[v 7→
a](v) = a, and s[v 7→ a](w) = s(w) for w 6= v.
The is the very prototype of a compositional semantic definition. Via
Dana Scott, this idea led to the use of environments in denotational
semantics (Scott, 1969). Environments are nowadays ubiquitous in all
forms of semantics in computer science (Winskel, 1993; Mitchell, 1996).
2.3.0.3. Teams Hodges’ key idea was to see that one must lift the
semantics of formulas from single assignments to sets of assignments.
Notions of dependence of one variable on others are only meaningful
among a set of assignments. Hodges called these sets “trumps”; we
follow (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007) in calling them teams.
We consider the semantics of Dependence logic (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007).
Formulas are built up from standard atomic formulas and their nega-
tions and the dependence predicates, by conjunction, disjunction, and
universal and existential quantification. We shall distinguish between
the usual atomic formulas (including equality statements) over the first-
order signature we are working with, and the dependence formulas. In
the case of the standard atomic formulas, we shall also allow their
negations, and as usual refer to positive and negated atomic formulas
collectively as literals. We shall not allow negations of dependence
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dependence, using the new connectives we will introduce in the next
section.
The set of all individual variables is denoted V. A team on X ⊆ V
is a set of Tarski assignments on X. We define the following operations
on teams:
− If T is a team on X and v ∈ V, then T [v 7→ A] is the team on
X ∪ {v} defined by:
T [v 7→ A] = {t[v 7→ a] | t ∈ T ∧ a ∈ A}.
− If T is a team on X, v ∈ V, and f : T −→ A, then T [v 7→ f ] is the
team on X ∪ {v} defined by:
T [v 7→ f ] = {t[v 7→ f(t)] | t ∈ T}.
2.3.0.4. The Satisfaction Relation We define a satisfaction relation
M, T |=X φ
where the free variables of φ are contained in X, and T is a team on
X. (In practice, we elide M).
Firstly, for literals L we have:
T |=X L ≡ ∀t ∈ T. t |=X L
where t |=X L is the standard Tarskian definition of satisfaction of
an atomic formula or its negation in a structure with respect to an
assignment.
2.3.0.5. Connectives and Quantifiers The clauses for connectives and
quantifiers are as follows:
T |=X φ ∧ ψ ≡ T |=X φ and T |=X ψ
T |=X φ ∨ ψ ≡ ∃U, V. ([U |=X φ and V |=X ψ] ∧ [T = U ∪ V ])
T |=X ∀v. φ ≡ T [v 7→ A] |=X∪{v} φ
T |=X ∃v. φ ≡ ∃f : T −→ A. T [v 7→ f ] |=X∪{v} φ.
2.3.0.6. Semantics of the dependence predicate Given a set of vari-
ables X and W ⊆ X, we define the following notions:
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8− An equivalence relation on assignments on X:
s ≃W t ≡ ∀w ∈W. s(w) = t(w).
− A function f : AX −→ A depends only on W , written f :
AX −→W A, if for some g : A
W −→ A, f = g ◦ pXW , where
pXW : A
X −→ AW is the evident projection. Note that if such a g
exists, it is unique.
Now we can define:
T |=X D(W,v) ≡ ∀s, t ∈ T. s ≃W t ⇒ s(v) = t(v)
Note that this expresses functional dependence, exactly as in database
theory (Armstrong, 1974).
An equivalent definition can be given in terms of the dependency con-
dition on functions:
T |=X D(W,v) ≡ ∃f : T −→W A.∀t ∈ T. t(v) = f(t).
Strictly speaking, this is the “positive part” of the definition as given
in (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007) following Hodges. There is also a negative part,
which defines satisfaction for φ as for the positive definition, but with
respect to the De Morgan dual φd of φ:
(φ ∨ ψ)d = φd ∧ ψd, (∃v. φ)d = ∀v. φd, etc.
This allows for a “game-theoretic negation”, which formally “inter-
changes the roˆles of the players”. It is simpler, and from our perspective
loses nothing, to treat this negation as a defined operation, and work
exclusively with formulas in negation normal form as above.
The theory of dependence logic: metalogical properties, connections
with second-order logic, complexity and definability issues, et cetera,
is extensively developed in (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007). However, as explained
in the Introduction, many basic questions remain. We shall now show
how the Hodges semantics can be seen in a new light, as arising from
a general construction.
3. The Hodges construction revisited
An important clue to the general nature of the construction is contained
in the observation by Hodges (Hodges, 1997a) (and then in (Va¨a¨na¨nen,
2007)) that the sets of teams denoted by formulas of IF-logic or Depen-
dence logic are downwards closed: that is, if T |= φ and S ⊆ T , then
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9S |= φ. This is immediately suggestive of well-known constructions on
ordered structures.
3.1. A general construction
We recall a couple of definitions. A commutative ordered monoid
is a structure (M,+, 0,6), where (M,6) is a partially ordered set,
and (M,+, 0) is a commutative monoid (a set with an associative and
commutative operation + with unit 0), such that + is monotone:
x 6 x′ ∧ y 6 y′ ⇒ x+ y 6 x′ + y′ .
The primary example we have in mind is P(AX), the set of all teams
on a set of variables X, which we think of as the commutative ordered
monoid (P(AX ),∪,∅,⊆).
A commutative quantale is a commutative ordered monoid where
the partial order is a complete lattice, and + distributes over all suprema:
m+
∨
i∈I mi =
∨
i∈I(m+mi).
Let (M,+, 0,6) be a commutative ordered monoid. Then L(M),
the set of lower (or downwards-closed) sets of M , ordered by inclusion,
is the free commutative quantale generated by M (Mitchell and
Simmons, 2001).7
A downwards closed subset of a partially ordered set P is a set S
such that:
x 6 y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ S .
Thus this notion generalizes the downwards closure condition on sets
of teams.
The following notation will be useful. Given X ⊆ P , where P is a
partially ordered set, we define
↓(X) = {x ∈ P | ∃y ∈ X.x 6 y} ,
the downwards closure of X. A set S is downwards closed if and
only if S = ↓(S).
As a commutative quantale, L(M) is a model of intuitionistic linear
logic (phase semantics (Yetter, 1990; Rosenthal, 1990; Girard, 1987)).8
In particular, we have
A⊗B = ↓{m+ n | m ∈ A ∧ n ∈ B}
A⊸ B = {m | ∀n. n ∈ A⇒ m+ n ∈ B}
We note that when the definition of ⊗, the multiplicative conjunc-
tion, is specialized to our concrete setting, it yields the definition of
disjunction in the Hodges semantics!
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The multiplicative implication ⊸ has not been considered previ-
ously in the setting of IF-logic and Dependence logic. However, it is
perfectly well defined, and is in fact uniquely specified as the adjoint
of the linear conjunction:
A⊗B 6 C ⇐⇒ A 6 B⊸ C .
Note that linear implication automatically preserves downwards clo-
sure.
3.2. What is the propositional logic of dependence?
In fact, L(M) carries a great deal of structure. Not only is it a com-
mutative quantale (and hence carries an interpretation of linear logic),
but it is also a complete Heyting algebra, and hence carries an
interpretation of intuitionistic logic.
We have the clauses
m |= A ∧B ≡ m |= A and m |= B
m |= A ∨B ≡ m |= A or m |= B
m |= A→ B ≡ ∀n 6 m. if n |= A then n |= B
The situation where we have both intuitionistic logic and multiplica-
tive linear logic coexisting is the setting for BI logic, the “logic of
Bunched Implications” of David Pym and Peter O’Hearn (O’Hearn and
Pym, 1999; Pym, 2002), which forms the basis for Separation logic
(Reynolds and O’Hearn) (Reynolds, 2002), an increasingly influential
logic for verification. The construction L(M) is exactly the way a “forc-
ing semantics” for BI-logic is converted into an algebraic semantics as
a “BI-algebra”, i.e. a structure which is both a commutative quantale
and a complete Heyting algebra (Pym et al., 2004). L(M) is in fact the
free construction of a complete BI-algebra over an ordered commutative
monoid.
This provides one reason for proposing BI-logic as the right answer to
the question posed at the beginning of this subsection. The compelling
further evidence for this claim will come from the natural roˆle played by
the novel connectives we are introducing into the logic of dependence.
This roˆle will become apparent in the subsequent developments in this
paper.
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3.3. BID-logic and its team semantics
We shall spell out the extended logical language we are led to consider,
and its concrete team semantics, extending the Hodges-style semantics
already given in section 2.
We call the extended language BID, for want of a better name.
Formulas are built from atomic formulas and their negations, and de-
pendence formulas, by the standard first-order quantifiers, and the
following propositional connectives: the intuitionistic (or “additive”)
connectives ∧, ∨, →, and the multiplicative connectives ⊗ and⊸.
3.3.0.7. Team Semantics for BI Logic The team semantics for BID-
logic is as follows:
T |= A ∧B ≡ T |= A and T |= B
T |= A ∨B ≡ T |= A or T |= B
T |= A→ B ≡ ∀U ⊆ T. if U |= A then U |= B
T |= A⊗B ≡ ∃U, V. T = U ∪ V ∧ U |= A ∧ V |= B
T |= A⊸ B ≡ ∀U. [U |= A⇒ T ∪ U |= B]
The clauses for atomic formulas and their negations and for the depen-
dence formulas and quantifiers are as given in section 2.
As already noted, the semantics of ∧ and ⊗ coincide with those
given for conjunction and disjunction in section 2. The connectives
∨ and →, intuitionistic or additive disjunction and implication, and
the multiplicative implication ⊸, are new as compared to IF-logic or
Dependence logic.
3.4. The semantics of sentences
It is worth spelling out the semantics of sentences explicitly. By defini-
tion, sentences have no free variables, and there is only one assignment
on the empty set of variables, which we can think of as the empty tuple
〈〉. In the Tarski semantics, there are only two possibilities for the set of
satisfying assignments of a sentence, ∅ and {〈〉}, which we can identify
with false and true respectively. When we pass to the team semantics
for BID-logic, there are three possibilities for down-closed set of teams
to be assigned to sentences: ∅, {∅}, or {∅, {〈〉}}. Thus the semantics
of sentences is trivalent in general.
In his papers, Hodges works only with non-empty teams, and has
bivalent semantics for sentences. However, there is no real conflict be-
tween his semantics and ours. Let BID− be BID-logic without the linear
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implication. Note that BID− properly contains Dependence logic, which
is expressively equivalent to IF-logic (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007).
Proposition 1 Every formula in BID−-logic is satisfied by the empty
team; hence in particular every sentence of BID−-logic has either {∅}
or {∅, {〈〉}} as its set of satisfying teams, and the semantics of sen-
tences in BID−-logic is bivalent.
Proof A straightforward induction on formulas of BID−-logic. 
On the other hand, linear implication clearly violates this property.
Note that the empty team satisfies A ⊸ B if and only if every team
satisfying A also satisfies B. We obtain as an immediate corollary:
Proposition 2 Linear implication is not definable in BID−-logic, and
a fortiori is not definable in Dependence logic or IF-logic.
3.5. The general Hodges construction
We shall briefly sketch, for the reader conversant with categorical logic,
the general form of the construction.
The standard Tarski semantics of first-order logic is a special case of
Lawvere’s notion of hyperdoctrine (Lawvere, 1969). We refer to (Pitts,
2000) for a lucid expository account. Construing L as a functor in the
appropriate fashion, we can give a general form of the Hodges construc-
tion as a functor from classical hyperdoctrines to BI-hyperdoctrines
(B. Biering, 2007). Given a classical hyperdoctrine P : Cop −→ Pos,
we define a BI-hyperdoctrine H(P) on the same base category by
composition with the functor L:
H(P) = L ◦P : Cop −→ Pos .
Note that Pos is an order-enriched category, and L is an order-enriched
functor, so it preserves adjoints, and hence in particular preserves the
interpretations of the quantifiers. This observation is spelled out in
more detail in Proposition 4.
This exactly generalizes the concrete Hodges construction, which is
obtained by applying H to the standard Tarski hyperdoctrine.
A full account will be given elsewhere.
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4. Quantifiers are adjoints in the Hodges construction
We recall the team semantics for the quantifiers.
T |=X ∀v. φ ≡ T [v 7→ A] |=X∪{v} φ
T |=X ∃v. φ ≡ ∃f : T −→ A. T [v 7→ f ] |=X∪{v} φ.
We may wonder what underlying principles dictate these definitions.
To answer this question, we firstly recall the fundamental insight
due to Lawvere (Lawvere, 1969) that quantifiers are adjoints to
substitution.9
4.1. Quantifiers as adjoints
Consider a function f : X → Y . This induces a function
f−1 : P(Y ) −→ P(X) :: T 7→ {x ∈ X | f(x) ∈ T}.
This function f−1 has both a left adjoint ∃(f) : P(X) −→ P(Y ), and
a right adjoint ∀(f) : P(X) −→ P(Y ). These adjoints are uniquely
specified by the following conditions. For all S ⊆ X, T ⊆ Y :
∃(f)(S) ⊆ T ⇐⇒ S ⊆ f−1(T ), f−1(T ) ⊆ S ⇐⇒ T ⊆ ∀(f)(S).
The unique functions satisfying these conditions can be defined explic-
itly as follows:
∃(f)(S) := {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ X. f(x) = y ∧ x ∈ S} ,
∀(f)(S) := {y ∈ Y | ∀x ∈ X. f(x) = y ⇒ x ∈ S} .
Given a formula φ with free variables in {v1, . . . , vn+1}, it will receive its
Tarskian denotation JφK in P(An+1) as the set of satisfying assignments:
JφK = {s ∈ An+1 | s |=X φ} .
We have a projection function
π : An+1 −→ An :: (a1, . . . , an+1) 7→ (a1, . . . , an) .
Note that this projection is the Tarskian denotation of the tuple of
terms (v1, . . . , vn). We can characterize the standard quantifiers as
adjoints to this projection:
J∀vn+1. φK = ∀(π)(JφK), J∃vn+1. φK = ∃(π)(JφK) .
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If we unpack the adjunction conditions for the universal quantifier, they
yield the following bidirectional inference rule:
Γ ⊢X φ
Γ ⊢X ∀vn+1. φ
X = {v1, . . . , vn} .
Here the set X keeps track of the free variables in the assumptions Γ.
Note that the usual “eigenvariable condition” is automatically taken
care of in this way.
Since adjoints are uniquely determined, this characterization com-
pletely captures the meaning of the quantifiers.
4.2. Quantifiers in the Hodges semantics
We shall now verify that the definitions of the quantifiers in the Hodges
semantics are exactly the images under L of their standard in-
terpretations in the Tarski semantics, and hence in particular that
they are adjoints to substitution. Thus these definitions are forced.
It will be convenient to work with the semantic view of quanti-
fiers, as operators on subsets. Consider formulas with free variables in
{v1, . . . , vn+1}. The Tarski semantics over a structure M = (A, . . .)
assigns such formulas values in P(An+1). We can regard the quantifiers
∃vn+1, ∀vn+1 as functions
∃(π),∀(π) : P(An+1) −→ P(An)
∃(π)(S) = {s ∈ An | ∃a ∈ A. s[vn+1 7→ a] ∈ S}
∀(π)(S) = {s ∈ An | ∀a ∈ A. s[vn+1 7→ a] ∈ S}
For any m, we define H(Am) = L(P(Am)). Thus H(Am) is the set of
downwards closed sets of teams on the variables {v1, . . . , vm}. This pro-
vides the corresponding “space” of semantic values for formulas in the
Hodges semantics. The interpretation of quantifiers in that semantics
is given by the following set operators:
∃H ,∀H : H(A
n+1) −→ H(An)
∃H(U) = {T ∈ P(A
n) | ∃f : T → A.T [vn+1 7→ f ] ∈ U}
∀H(U) = {T ∈ P(A
n) | T [vn+1 7→ A] ∈ U}
We extend the definition of L to act on functions10 h : P(Y ) −→ P(X):
L(h) : H(Y ) −→ H(X) :: U 7→ ↓{h(T ) | T ∈ U} .
In the case that h = f−1, where f : X −→ Y , we write L(h) = H(f).
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Proposition 3 The Hodges quantifiers are the image under L of the
Tarski quantifiers:
∃H = L(∃(π)), ∀H = L(∀(π)) .
Proof Firstly, we show that L(∃(π))(U) ⊆ ∃H(U) for all U ∈ H(A
n+1).
Suppose that T ∈ U. Let T ′ = ∃(π)(T ). This means that
∀t ∈ T ′.∃a ∈ A. t[vn+1 7→ a] ∈ T .
Using the axiom of choice, there exists a function f : T ′ −→ A such
that
T ′[vn+1 7→ f ] ⊆ T ∈ U .
Since U is downwards closed, this implies that T ′ ∈ ∃H(U), as required.
The converse follows immediately from the fact that
∃(π)(T [vn+1 7→ f ]) = T .
Next we show that L(∀(π))(U) ⊆ ∀H(U). Since
(∀(π)(T ))[vn+1 7→ A] ⊆ T ,
if T ∈ U, then ∀(π)(T ) ∈ ∀H(U) by downwards closure. The converse
follows similarly from T ⊆ ∀(π)(T [vn+1 7→ A]). 
Proposition 4 The Hodges quantifiers are adjoints to substitution:
1. ∃H is left adjoint to H(π):
∃H(U) ⊆ V ⇐⇒ U ⊆ H(π)(V) .
2. ∀H is right adjoint to H(π):
H(π)(V) ⊆ U ⇐⇒ V ⊆ ∀H(U) .
Proof It is straightforward to verify the adjunction conditions di-
rectly. We give a more conceptual argument. There is a natural point-
wise ordering on monotone functions between partially ordered sets,
h, k : P −→ Q:
h 6 k ≡ ∀x ∈ P. h(x) 6 k(x) .
L is an order-enriched functor with respect to this ordering. Func-
toriality means that
L(h ◦ g) = L(h) ◦ L(g), L(idM ) = idL(M) ,
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while order-enrichment means that
h 6 k ⇒ L(h) 6 L(k) .
These properties imply that L automatically preserves adjointness.
That is, if we are given monotone maps
f : P −→ Q, g : Q −→ P
such that idP 6 g ◦ f and f ◦ g 6 idQ, i.e. so that f is left adjoint to g,
then
idL(P ) = L(idP ) 6 L(g ◦ f) = L(g) ◦ L(f) ,
and similarly L(f)◦L(g) 6 idL(Q), so L(f) is left adjoint to L(g) (and of
course L(g) is right adjoint to L(f)). Combining this with Proposition 3
yields the required result. 
4.3. The dependence-friendly quantifiers
We shall also give characterizations of the dependence-guarded quan-
tifiers as certain adjoints: this will be our first use of the intuitionistic
implication.
We recall the definition of the dependence-friendly existential quan-
tifier:
(∃x \ x1, . . . , xn). φ ≡ ∃x.(D(x1, . . . , xn, x) ∧ φ) .
There has not been a comparably natural notion of dependence-friendly
universal quantification. According to our analysis, this is because the
appropriate connective needed to express the right notion, namely in-
tuitionistic implication, has not been available. Using it, we can define
such a quantifier:
(∀x \ x1, . . . , xn). φ ≡ ∀x.(D(x1, . . . , xn, x) → φ) .
As evidence for the naturalness of these quantifiers, we shall express
them both as adjoints.
Firstly, we recall that intuitionistic conjunction and implication are
related by another fundamental adjointness (Lawvere, 1969):
U ∩ V ⊆W ⇐⇒ U ⊆ V→W . (1)
This can be expressed as a bidirectional inference rule:
φ ∧ ψ ⊢ θ
φ ⊢ ψ → θ .
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Next, we extend our semantic notation to the dependence-friendly
quantifiers. Given W ⊆ {v1, . . . , vn}, we define DW ∈ H(A
n+1):
DW = {T | ∀s, t ∈ T. s ≃W t ⇒ s(vn+1) = t(vn+1)} .
Now we can define the semantic operators corresponding to the dependence-
friendly quantifiers:
∃W ,∀W : H(A
n+1) −→ H(An)
∃W (U) = ∃H(DW ∩ U)
∀W (U) = ∀H(DW → U)
Proposition 5 The dependence-friendly existential ∃W is left adjoint
to the following operation:
V 7→ (DW → H(π)(V)) .
The dependence-friendly universal ∀W is right adjoint to the following
operation:
V 7→ (DW ∩H(π)(V)) .
Proof A direct verification is straightforward, but it suffices to ob-
serve that adjoints compose, and then to use Proposition 4 and the
adjointness (1). 
Of course, the analysis we have given in this sub-section applies to
any guarded quantifiers; the dependence predicates play no special roˆle
here. The point is to show how the intuitionistic connectives round out
the logic in a natural fashion. We shall apply them to a finer analysis
of dependence itself in section 6.
5. Full Abstraction
We shall now prove a full abstraction result in the sense of Hodges
(Hodges, 1997a).11 The point of this is to show that, even if we take
sentences and their truth-values as primary, the information contained
in the semantics of formulas in general is not redundant, since when-
ever two formulas receive different denotations, they make different
contributions overall to the truth-values assigned to sentences.
The fact that such a result holds for BID−-logic is notable, in that
the logic is highly non-classical, while the semantics of sentences is bi-
valent. For BID-logic, the set of possible truth values for open formulas
is huge even in finite models (Cameron and Hodges, 2001), while the
semantics of sentences is trivalent.
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While our argument follows that of Hodges (Hodges, 1997a), we
find a natural roˆle for the intuitionistic implication, and can give a very
simple proof, while Hodges’ argument goes through the correspondence
with the game-theoretical semantics.
To formalize full abstraction, we introduce the notion of a senten-
tial context with respect to a set of variables X. This is a formula
with an occurrence of a “hole” [·] such that inserting a formula with
free variables in X into the hole yields a sentence. Now consider two
formulas φ and ψ of BID-logic, with free variables inX. We say that the
formulas are semantically equivalent if they have the same denota-
tions, i.e. the same sets of satisfying teams, in all interpretations with
respect to all structures. We say that φ and ψ are observationally
equivalent if for all sentential contexts C[·] for X, C[φ] and C[ψ] are
assigned the same truth values in all interpretations. The fact that
semantic equivalence implies observational equivalence follows imme-
diately from the compositional form of the semantics. The converse is
full abstraction.12
Proposition 6 The team semantics is fully abstract for any sublan-
guage of BID-logic containing universal quantification and intuitionistic
implication.
Proof Suppose that JφK\JψK in some interpretation contains a team
T . Extend the language with a relation symbol R, and the interpreta-
tion by assigning ↓(T ) to R. Then use the context
C[·] ≡ ∀v1, . . . ,∀vn. (R(v1, . . . , vn)→ [·])
where the free variables in φ and ψ are contained in {v1, . . . , vn}. Then
C[φ] is true (satisfied by the empty tuple), since for every team T ′
satisfying R(v1, . . . , vn), T
′ ⊆ T , and hence by assumption and down-
wards closure, T ′ satisfies φ. This means that all teams over {v1, . . . , vn}
satisfy the implication R(v1, . . . , vn) → φ, and hence 〈〉 satisfies C[φ].
On the other hand, C[ψ] is not satisfied by the empty tuple, since T
satisfies R(v1, . . . , vn), while T does not satisfy ψ by assumption. 
Note that the use of the intuitionistic implication in relativizing to
those teams satisfying the precondition R(v1, . . . , vn) is exactly what is
needed.
6. Analyzing Dependence
We now turn to the dependence predicate itself. Since it encapsulates
the “jump” from first-order to second-order semantics, we cannot be
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too hopeful about taming it axiomatically13 . But it turns out that we
can give a finer analysis in BID-logic.
Consider the following “trivial” case of dependence:
C(v) ≡ D(∅, v) .
This expresses that v depends on nothing at all, and hence has a fixed
value — functional dependency for the constant function. Semantically,
this is the following simple special case of the semantics of dependence:
T |=X C(v) ≡ ∀t1, t2 ∈ T. t1(v) = t2(v) .
Using the intuitionistic implication, we can define the general depen-
dence predicate from this special case:
D(W,v) :=
( ∧
w∈W
C(w)
)
→ C(v) (2)
Proposition 7 The definition of D from C is semantically equivalent
to the definition given previously:
T |=X D(W,v) ≡ ∀s, t ∈ T. s ≃W t ⇒ s(v) = t(v).)
Proof This is just an exercise in unwinding the definitions. Note
that the intuitionistic implication lets us range over all subsets of the
team which are in a single equivalence class under ≃W , and require
that v is constant on those subsets. 
6.1. Armstrong Axioms
The current stock of plausible axioms for the dependence predicates is
limited to the Armstrong axioms from database theory (Armstrong,
1974). These are a standard complete set of axioms for functional
dependence. They can be given as follows.
(1) Always D(x, x).
(2) If D(x, y, z), then D(y, x, z).
(3) If D(x, x, y), then D(x, y).
(4) If D(x, z), then D(x, y, z).
(5) If D(x, y) and D(y, z), then D(x, z).
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However, in the light of our analysis, the Armstrong axioms simply fall
out as standard properties of implication and conjunction.14 If we set
p = C(x), q = C(y), r = C(z), and use (2) to translate the Armstrong
axioms into purely implicational form, we see that they correspond to
the following:
(1) p→ p.
(2) (p→ q → r)→ (q → p→ r).
(3) (p→ p→ q)→ (p→ q).
(4) (p→ r)→ (p→ q → r).
(5) (p→ q)→ (q → r)→ (p→ r).
These are the well-known axioms I, C, W, K, B respectively15 (Curry
and Feys, 1958) — which form a complete axiomatization of intu-
itionistic (but not classical!) implication.16 A standard example of a
classically valid implicational formula which is not derivable from these
axioms is Peirce’s law: ((p→ q)→ p)→ p.
Thus we have reduced the understanding of the dependence predi-
cate to understanding of the, prima facie simpler, constancy predicate
C.
7. Further Directions
In this final section, we shall sketch a number of further directions.
Detailed accounts are under development, and will appear elsewhere.
7.1. Completeness
Predicate BI-logic is a well developed formalism, with a proof theory
which is sound and complete relative to an algebraic semantics (Pym,
2002). Since BID-logic is a special case, we have a sound ambient infer-
ence system. Of course this is not complete for the intended semantics
for BID-logic — and cannot be. We may hope to obtain completeness
for some smaller class of models, possibly on the lines of the Henkin
completeness theorem for higher-order logic (Henkin, 1950).
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7.2. Diagrams
Now fix a particular interpretation in a structure M with universe A.
Consider the following construction. We introduce constants for each
a ∈ A, the usual first order diagram (all true atomic sentences), and
the following infinitary axiom:
∀v.
⊗
a∈A
(v = a) .
We can define the predicate C (and hence dependence D) by the
following infinitary formula:
C(v) :=
∨
a∈A
(v = a) .
Note how the two different connectives (one additive, the other multi-
plicative) feature naturally.
This gives a logical (albeit infinitary) characterization of depen-
dence.
7.3. Representation
We can also consider representation theory for the structures H(X) =
L(P(X)). We seek lattice-theoretic properties of these structures which
suffice to characterize them.
Firstly, we note that the down-closures of single teams are exactly
the complete join-primes of the lattice:
a 6
∨
i
bi ⇒ ∃i. a 6 bi.
Moreover, these join-primes order generate, i.e. every element is the
join of the join-primes below it. All of this structure is in terms of the
intuitionistic disjunction.
Next, we note that the join-primes are closed under⊗, which is more-
over idempotent on the join-primes, endowing them with the structure
of a semilattice. This is very different to the semilattice structure given
by intuitionistic disjunction: e.g.
↓(T1) ∨ ↓(T2) = ↓({T1, T2}) 6= ↓(T1 ∪ T2) = ↓(T1)⊗ ↓(T2) .
The double singletons are exactly the complete atoms in this semi-
lattice, which is complete atomic in the usual sense.
Syntactically, assuming names for elements, we can describe these
atomic join-primes in the lattice of propositions over variables v1, . . . , vn
as
(v1 = a1) ∧ · · · ∧ (vn = an).
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These are of course the tuples. (Downclosures of) arbitrary teams are
then described by expressions
⊗
iAi, where Ai ranges over such atoms.
Arbitrary elements are joins (intuitionistic disjunctions) of such ele-
ments. So there is a normal form for general elements:∨
i
⊗
ij
Aij .
Moreover, from the lattice-theoretic properties it is easily shown that
the ordering between such normal forms agrees with the set inclusion
ordering.
7.4. Expressiveness
One of the defining characteristics of Dependence Logic as well as IF-
logic is that they can be expressed in Existential Second Order Logic,
Σ11, and conversely, every Σ
1
1 definable property of structures can be
expressed with a sentence of Dependence Logic. Both are true even
on finite structures. To see what this connection with Σ11 means let us
adopt the notation that if T is a team on a set X of variables, then
rel(T ) is the corresponding relation. Hodges (Hodges, 1997b) associates
with every formula φ of IF-logic (equivalently, of Dependence Logic)
with free variables in the set X = {x1, ..., xn} an Existential Second
Order sentence τφ(R), with R an n-ary predicate symbol, such that in
any model M and for any team T on X the following holds:
M, T |=X φ ⇐⇒ (M, rel(T )) |= τφ(R). (3)
Conversely, if Φ is any Existential Second Order sentence, then there
is a sentence φ of Dependence Logic such that the following holds for
all models M:
M |= Φ ⇐⇒ M, {〈〉} |= φ.
Virtually all model theoretic properties of Dependence Logic follow
from this relationship with Σ11, for example, the Compactness Theorem,
the downward and upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems, the Interpo-
lation Theorem, and the fact that every sentence φ in Dependence Logic
for which there exists a “negation” ψ such that for all M
M |= φ ⇐⇒ M 6|= ψ,
is actually first order definable17. Also the interesting fact that the
class of properties of finite structures expressible in Dependence Logic
is exactly NP follows from this. Because of these connections it is quite
interesting to ask whether the extensions BID− and BID can likewise
be embedded in Σ11, the existential fragment of Second Order Logic.
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Now the question arises which semantics one should use. To be able
to compare results with Dependence Logic and IF-logic, we use the full
semantics familiar from (Hodges, 1997a) and (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007).
Proposition 8 There is no translation of any extension of Depen-
dence Logic containing either intuitionistic implication or linear im-
plication into existential second order Σ11. The same is true on finite
models, assuming NP 6=co-NP.
Proof Let φ(x1) be a formula of Dependence Logic in the empty
vocabulary such that for any team T : M, T |= φ(x1) if and only if A
is infinite18. Let ⊥ denote a sentence in the empty vocabulary, only
satisfied by the empty team, e.g. ∀x.x = x ∧ ¬x = x. Suppose there
were an Existential Second Order sentence τ(R) such that a model M
and a team T on {x1} satisfy φ(x1) → ⊥ if and only if (M, rel(T ))
satisfies τ(R). IfM is any finite model and T = {s}, where s(x1) ∈M ,
thenM, T |= φ(x1)→ ⊥, whence (M, {s(x1)}) |= τ(R)∧∃x1R(x1). By
the Compactness Theorem of Existential Second Order Logic, τ(R) ∧
∃x1R(x1) has an infinite model (M
′, rel(T ′)). Thus M′ and the team
T ′ satisfy φ(x1) → ⊥. Moreover, T
′ 6= ∅. By the definition of the
semantics of →, since T ′ satisfies φ(x1) in M
′, T ′ must satisfy ⊥, a
contradiction.
Let us then consider finite models. It is easy to write down a formula
φ(x1) of Dependence Logic in the vocabulary of graphs such that for any
team T 6= ∅: M, T |= φ(x1) if and only if M is 3-colorable. Let ⊥ be
as above. IfM is any graph that is not 3-colorable and T = {s}, where
s(x1) ∈ M , then M, T |= φ(x1) → ⊥. On the other hand, suppose M
is 3-colorable, but M and some team {s} satisfy φ(x1) → ⊥. By the
definition of the semantics of →, since {s} satisfies φ(x1) in M, {s}
must satisfy ⊥, a contradiction. Thus a graphM and a team {s} satisfy
φ(x1)→ ⊥ if and only ifM is not 3-colorable. Suppose now there were
an Existential Second Order sentence τ(R) such that a graph M and
a team T satisfy φ(x1) → ⊥ if and only if (M, rel(T )) satisfies τ(R).
Then we could check if a graphM is not 3-colorable by checking if τ(R)
is satisfied by M and and a team {s}, where s can be any assignment.
The latter is NP, so we get NP=co-NP.
The same argument can be used to show that ⊸ leads outside of
Σ11: Suppose φ(x1) is as above and there is an Existential Second Order
sentence τ(R) such that a modelM and a team T satisfy ⊥ ∧ (φ(x1)⊸
⊥) if and only if (M, rel(T )) satisfies τ(R). If M is any finite model
and T = ∅, then M, T |= ⊥ ∧ (φ ⊸ ⊥), whence (M,∅) |= τ(R).
By the Compactness Theorem of Existential Second Order Logic, τ(R)
has an infinite model (M′, rel(T ′)). Thus M′ and the team T ′ satisfy
⊥ ∧ (φ ⊸ ⊥). In particular, T ′ = ∅ and ∅ satisfies φ⊸ ⊥. Since in
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this model any {s} satisfies φ, by the definition of the semantics of⊸,
{s} satisfies ⊥, a contradiction. 
The proof actually shows that BID fails to satisfy the Compactness
Theorem. A similar argument shows that BID fails to satisfy the Down-
ward Lo¨wenheim Skolem Theorem.
Proposition 9 There is a translation of BID into Full Second Order
Logic.
Proof We follow (Hodges, 1997b) (see also (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007)) and
present only the additions needed over and above Dependence Logic
and IF-logic:
τφ⊸ψ(R) = ∀S(τφ(S)→ ∀U(∀~x(U(~x)↔ (S(~x) ∨R(~x)))→ τψ(U)))
τφ→ψ(R) = ∀S(∀~x(S(~x)→ R(~x))→ (τφ(S)→ τψ(S))) .

In conclusion, we may say that BID− and BID seem to have a more
robust and uniform algebraic structure than Dependence Logic and
IF-logic. We anticipate that this is reflected also in an effective proof
theory, still to be developed. On the other hand the price of this seems
to be that “nice” model theoretic properties are lost, at least in the full
semantics. Perhaps there are some underlying, hitherto unidentified,
reasons why logics developed for dependence cannot simultaneously
have a “nice” model theory and effective proof theory. After all, we
know from Lindstro¨m’s Theorem ((Lindstro¨m, 1969)) that there are
intrinsic obstacles to having model-theoretically defined extensions of
first order logic with both nice proof theory and nice model theory.
However, we have a trivalent logic, unlike the setting considered by
Lindstro¨m. So it is too early to say whether there are general reasons
why BID does not satisfy Compactness and other model theoretic
properties familiar from Dependence Logic, or whether we have just
not found the right concepts yet.
Notes
1 See e.g. online resources such as
http://library.wolfram.com/infocenter/MathSource/4734/.
2 This can be described as the fragment comprising formulas ∃f1 . . .∃fn. φ, where
the fi are function variables, and φ is a first-order formula over a signature extended
by these function variables.
3 In (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007) the notation =(x1, . . . , xn, x) for D(x1, . . . , xn, x) is used.
4 Hintikka has apparently not conceded the point (Hintikka, 2002), although there
is no argument as to the mathematical content of Hodges’ results. As far as we are
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concerned, Hodges’ semantics meets all the criteria for a compositional semantics,
and is moreover fully abstract. Our concern here is to understand it better, as an
interesting construction in its own right.
5 The classic reference is (Tarski, 1936), but in fact the modern model-theoretic
definition first appeared in (Tarski and Vaught, 1956), as pointed out in Wilfrid
Hodges’ article on “Tarski’s Truth Definitions” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/,
which gives an informative overview.
6 Explictly, an assignment is simply a function s : X → A. We write AX for
the set of all such assignments. Older tradition was to define satisfaction relative
to assignments to all variables, which were typically arrayed in infinite sequences.
More recently, it has been understood, under the influence of categorical logic, that
to reveal the salient structure one should give the definition relative to a finite
environment that grows as quantifiers are stripped off in the recursive definition.
7 More precisely, it is the left adjoint to the evident forgetful functor.
8 It is also an instance of Urquhart’s semilattice semantics for relevance logic
(Urquhart, 1972). Mitchell and Simmons observe in (Mitchell and Simmons, 2001)
that in the case (such as ours) where the monoid is a boolean algebra, L(M) is
actually a model of classical linear logic. This does not seem apposite to our
purposes here.
9 See (Davey and Priestley, 2002) for an introduction to adjunctions on posets.
10 More precisely, homomorphisms of the appropriate kind. The reader familiar
with category theory will see that we are really specifying the functorial action of L
in a particular case.
11 As Hodges notes, he himself takes the term, and the concept, from Computer
Science (Milner, 1977; Plotkin, 1977).
12 While this notion is perfectly consistent with usage in Computer Science, one
very important tensioning ingredient in the programming language context is miss-
ing, namely correspondence with an independently defined operational semantics
(Milner, 1977; Plotkin, 1977).
13 See (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2001) for details on this.
14 Formal connections between the Armstrong axioms and propositional logic were
made by Fagin (Fagin, 1977). He only considered Horn clauses, so the distinction
between intuitionistic and classical logic was not apparent. Nevertheless, the passage
to two-element subsets in the “Semantic proof of the Equivalence Theorem” in
(Fagin, 1977) implicitly involves similar reasoning to Proposition 7.
15 Axiom (4) as given generalizes the standard K axiom p → q → p, which is
obviously derivable from (1) and (4) by substitution and Modus Ponens.
16 Under the (Curry part of the) Curry-Howard correspondence, they correspond
to a well-known functionally complete set of combinators (Curry and Feys, 1958).
17 See e.g. (Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007) for details.
18 The free variable x1 plays no role in this.
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